We test the dividend and leverage predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order models. As both models predict, more profitable firms have higher long-term dividend payouts, and firms with more investments have lower payouts. Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the tradeoff model, more profitable firms are less levered. Firms with more investment opportunities are also less levered, which is in line with the tradeoff model and a complex version of the pecking order model.
The finance literature offers two competing models of financing decisions. In the tradeoff model, firms identify their optimal leverage by weighing the costs and benefits of an additional dollar of debt.
The benefits of debt include, for example, the tax deductibility of interest and the reduction of free cash flow problems. The costs of debt include potential bankruptcy costs and agency conflicts between stockholders and bondholders. At the leverage optimum, the benefit of the last dollar of debt just offsets the cost. The tradeoff model makes a similar prediction about dividends. Firms maximize value by selecting the dividend payout that equates the costs and benefits of the last dollar of dividends. Myers (1984) develops an alternative pecking order model of financing decisions. The pecking order arises if the costs of issuing new securities overwhelm other costs and benefits of dividends and debt. The financing costs that produce pecking order behavior include the transaction costs associated with new issues and the costs that arise because of management's superior information about the firm's prospects and the value of its risky securities. Because of these costs, firms finance new investments first with retained earnings, then with safe debt, then with risky debt, and finally, under duress, with equity.
As a result, variation in a firm's leverage is driven not by the tradeoff model's costs and benefits of debt, but rather by the firm's net cash flows (cash earnings minus investment outlays).
We test the dividend and leverage predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order models. Our menu is ambitious. We examine predictions about how long-term leverage and dividend payout ratios vary across firms with the two main driving variables proposed by the two models -profitability and investment opportunities. We also test the tradeoff model's prediction that leverage is mean-reverting.
And we test the pecking order's predictions about how financing decisions respond to short-term variation in earnings and investment.
To our knowledge, we are the first to test the predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order models about the dividend payout ratio. But one can argue that our leverage results and our results on how firms accommodate short-term variation in earnings and investment largely just confirm previous evidence.
Our retort is that the existing evidence is a bit piecemeal, it is often based on small samples, and, most important, it is uniformly subject to a statistical problem that undermines the credibility of all inferences.
For example, studies of the determinants of target leverage usually estimate a single cross-section regression, using a short time period [Bradley, Jarrel, and Kim (1984) , Long and Malitz (1985) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Titman and Wessels (1988) ]. The samples in these tests are sometimes large; for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) have 2079 firms in their tests on U.S. data. But the papers that use a single cross-section regression to study target leverage do not actually examine whether leverage tends to revert to a target. The few papers that test for mean reversion use small samples [143 firms in Auerbach (1985) , 108 in Jalilvand and Harris (1984) ]. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is the only paper that addresses the response of debt to short-term variation in investment and earnings. It is limited to a small sample of 157 firms that survive the entire 1971-89 period. We jointly examine target leverage, the mean reversion of leverage, and the short-term response of leverage to variation in earnings and investment in annual samples that cover the 1965-97 period and include an average of 2844 firms.
In our view, however, the serious problem in the empirical leverage literature is under-stated standard errors that cloud all inferences. Previous work uses either cross-section regressions or panel (pooled time-series and cross-section) regressions. When cross-section regressions are used, the inference problem due to correlation of the residuals across firms is ignored. The papers that use panel regressions ignore both the cross-correlation problem and the bias in the standard errors of regression slopes that arises because the residuals are correlated across years.
In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (FM, 1973) , we use the average slopes from year-by-year cross-section regressions to study the determinants of leverage (and dividends), and we use the timeseries standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. Our average slopes are like the slopes from a single panel (pooled time-series cross-section) regression of the type common in the literature.
And the FM average regression slopes capture the same information as the slopes from a panel regression.
The FM approach is just a simple way to obtain robust standard errors that capture whatever contributes to the precision of the average slopes. For example, the power of our large annual cross-sections reduces the variation in the year-by-year slopes and lowers the standard errors of the average slopes. If the regression disturbances tend to be positively correlated across firms, this increases the volatility of the annual slopes and the standard errors of the average slopes. The standard errors of the average slopes are also robust with respect to heteroscedasticity, since there is no heteroscedasticity correction for a sample mean. And we can use the time-series properties of the annual slopes to allow for autocorrelation.
The FM approach points to serious problems in previous studies that uniformly fail to allow for cross-correlation and autocorrelation. Cross-correlation almost always inflates the standard errors of the average slopes in the dividend and leverage regressions by a factor of more than two and often more than five. In the regressions for the determinants of target leverage, autocorrelation produces an additional increase of about 250 percent in the standard errors of the average slopes. In the dividend regressions and the regressions that test the mean reversion of leverage, allowing for autocorrelation increases the standard errors of the average slopes by about 40 percent. In short, the standard errors in previous capital structure tests are almost surely understated by large but in the end unknown amounts. In our view, this means that inferences from previous tests (the things we think we know about capital structure) lack credibility until they are confirmed by robust methods. Though many of our results are new, one of the contributions of this paper is a credible statistical foundation for a wide range of existing results.
A synopsis of our evidence is difficult since the tests are tightly linked to our interpretation of the tradeoff and pecking order models. Thus, we leave an overview of the results to the conclusions. (The impatient reader can of course look ahead.) For the moment, suffice it to say that though motivated by different forces, the tradeoff and pecking order models share many predictions about dividends and debt.
These shared predictions do well in our tests. On issues where the two models differ, we identify one big contradiction of the tradeoff model and one less serious contradiction of the pecking order.
The story proceeds as follows. Section I summarizes the tradeoff and pecking order models.
Sections II and III use cross-section regressions to make inferences about how dividends and leverage line up with the predictions of the two models. Section IV concludes. There is also an appendix, which uses sorts to establish the properties of key variables and provide qualitative perspective on the more formal results produced by the regressions.
I. Predictions
Our discussion of the tradeoff and pecking order models largely focuses on predictions about how leverage and the dividend payout ratio vary with profitability, investment opportunities, and the volatility of earnings and cash flows. Myers (1984) uses Myers and Majluf (1984) to motivate the pecking order. In Myers and Majluf, managers use private information to issue risky securities when they are over-priced. Investors are aware of this asymmetric information problem, and they discount the firm's new and existing securities when new issues are announced. Because managers anticipate these price discounts, they are reluctant to issue risky debt and equity, and they may forego profitable investments if they must be financed with new risky securities. Managers prefer to finance projects with retained earnings, which involve no asymmetric information problem, and with low risk debt, for which the problem is negligible. Myers (1984) suggests that the costs of issuing risky debt or equity overwhelm the forces that determine optimal leverage in the tradeoff model. The result is the pecking order. To minimize asymmetric information costs and other financing costs, firms finance investments first with retained earnings, then with safe debt, then with risky debt, and finally, under duress, with equity. Myers (1984) acknowledges that the pecking order model does not explain why firms pay dividends. But when firms choose (perhaps for other reasons) to pay dividends, pecking order considerations should also affect dividend decisions. Specifically, since it is expensive to raise outside funds, dividends are less attractive for firms with less profitable assets in place and large current and expected investments. Thus, controlling for investment opportunities, more profitable firms pay out more of their earnings as dividends. But given profitability, there is a negative relation between the payout ratio and investment opportunities. Myers (1984) also posits that, once set, dividends are (for unknown reasons) sticky, leaving variation in net cash flows to be absorbed largely by debt.
A. Pecking Order Model
Pecking order predictions about leverage are more complicated. In a pecking order world, debt typically grows when investment exceeds retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings. Thus, if profitability and investment outlays are persistent, the simple version of the model predicts that, holding investment fixed, leverage is lower for more profitable firms, and given profitability, leverage is higher for firms with more investments.
In a more complex view of the model, also offered by Myers (1984) , firms are concerned with future as well as current financing costs. Balancing current and future costs, it is possible that firms with large expected investments maintain low-risk debt capacity to avoid financing future investments with new risky securities, or foregoing the investments. It is thus possible that, controlling for profitability, firms with larger expected investments have less current leverage.
How can pecking order firms keep leverage down when investments are persistently large relative to earnings? Dividend payers can lower dividends or not raise them when earnings increase. Firms that do not pay dividends can refrain from starting when earnings are strong. Firms going public can issue more equity in anticipation of future investment. And when publicly traded firms choose to bear the high financing costs of new equity, they can issue more of it to accommodate future investment.
It is possible that none of this works; that is, the balance of financing costs in the pecking order may force many firms with persistently large investments relative to earnings to have high leverage (the prediction of the simple version of the model). This is unlikely for dividend payers since they have a source of retained earnings (lower dividends or smaller increases) that can help maintain less leverage.
Moreover, Fama and French (2000) find that (as the pecking order model predicts) dividend payers tend to be firms with high earnings relative to investment. Thus, for dividend payers, we are comfortable with the prediction that given the profitability of assets in place, firms with larger expected investments have less current leverage. For non-payers, this prediction is more tenuous. Myers (1984) argues that in a pecking order world, firms do not have leverage targets. Our analysis seems to suggest that considering future as well as current financing costs leads to such targets.
If so, the targets are soft. Firms with more expected investments may tend to have less leverage, but period-by-period variation in net cash flows is still largely absorbed by debt. Moreover, any leverage targets are one-sided; firms have no particular incentive to increase leverage when positive net cash flows push it below values that allow expected investments to be financed with retained earnings and low-risk debt. This is in contrast to the tradeoff model (discussed next) where the costs and benefits of debt push under-levered firms up and over-levered firms down toward their leverage targets.
Finally, considering future as well as current financing costs leads to a pecking order prediction about how the volatility of net cash flows affects dividends and debt. To lower the chance of issuing new risky securities or foregoing profitable investments when net cash flows are low, firms with more volatile net cash flows are likely to have lower dividend payouts and less leverage.
B. The Tradeoff Model
In the tradeoff model, leverage and dividend targets are driven by an amalgam of forces.
Potential bankruptcy costs, for example, push firms toward less target leverage, while the agency costs of free cash flow push them toward more. The tradeoff forces we consider make almost unanimous predictions about how target leverage and the dividend payout vary across firms with profitability and investment opportunities. The tradeoff model's predictions about dividends are similar to those of the pecking order model. But the models have some disagreements about leverage.
Bankruptcy Costs -Expected bankruptcy costs rise when profitability declines, and the threat of these costs pushes less profitable firms toward lower leverage targets. Similarly, expected bankruptcy costs are higher for firms with more volatile earnings, which should drive smaller less-diversified firms toward less target leverage. Bankruptcy costs also affect dividend payouts. Everything else the same, dividends cause firms to issue more debt. Since this increases the probability of bankruptcy, less profitable and more volatile firms are likely to choose lower target payout ratios.
Taxes -Taxes have two offsetting effects on optimal capital structures. The deductibility of corporate interest payments pushes firms toward more target leverage, while the higher personal tax rate on debt, relative to equity, pushes them toward less leverage. In Miller and Scholes (1978) , the personal tax rate implicit in the pricing of a firm's interest payments does not vary with its leverage. If the marginal benefit of the corporate tax deduction is also constant at all levels of profit and loss, taxes do not produce an interior optimum for leverage. Whether taxes push a firm toward maximum leverage, no leverage, or indeterminate leverage depends on whether the constant marginal corporate tax saving is greater than, less than, or equal to the constant marginal personal tax cost. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) develop a model that allows the marginal benefit of the corporate tax deduction of interest to vary with leverage, and so produces an interior optimum for leverage. In their model, optimal leverage is determined by the size of a firm's non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation and R&D expenditures. The larger a firm's non-debt tax shields, (i) the larger its chance of having no taxable income, (ii) the lower its expected corporate tax rate, and (iii) the lower its expected payoff from interest tax shields. Thus, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) predict that leverage is inversely related to the level of non-debt tax shields.
Tests of the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) model typically focus on non-debt tax shields, but the model implies a more general prediction about leverage and profitability. The driving force in their argument is asymmetric taxation of profits and losses. The government does not subsidize corporate losses as heavily as it taxes profits, so more profitable firms face a higher expected marginal tax rate. For low levels of earnings, progressive corporate tax rates reinforce the link between expected profitability and the expected tax rate. As a result, the expected payoff from interest tax shields is higher for more profitable firms and for firms with less volatile earnings. The deductibility of corporate interest thus pushes more profitable and less volatile firms toward higher leverage.
Agency Stories -In the agency models of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) , and Jensen (1986) , the interests of managers are not aligned with those of securityholders, and managers tend to waste free cash flow (the excess of cash earnings over profitable investments) on perquisites and bad investments. Dividends and especially debt help control this agency problem by forcing managers to pay out more of the firm's excess cash. A firm's free cash flow is determined by the earnings from its assets in place and the size of its profitable investments. The model predicts that to control the agency costs created by free cash flow, firms with more profitable assets in place commit a larger fraction of their pre-interest earnings to debt payments and dividends. Thus, controlling for investment opportunities, the dividend payout and leverage are positively related to profitability. Conversely, firms with more investments relative to earnings have less need for the discipline of dividends and debt. Thus, controlling for profitability, firms with more investment opportunities should have lower dividend payouts and less leverage. Incentives to control the stockholder-bondholder agency problem that arises when debt is risky [the underinvestment and asset substitution conflicts discussed by Fama and Miller (1972) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , and Myers (1977) ] also lead to the prediction that firms with more investment opportunities should have lower dividend payouts and less leverage. Costs -Myers (1984) builds the pecking order model on the assumption that asymmetric information problems and other financing costs overwhelm the forces that determine optimal leverage in the tradeoff model. But if financing costs do not overpower other factors, the tradeoff model survives, and firms weigh all costs and benefits when setting leverage targets. And the adjustment (financing) costs of the pecking order affect the targets. To reduce the likelihood of having to issue risky securities or forego profitable investments, firms set leverage and dividend payout targets below their noadjustment-cost optimal values. The shift toward less leverage and lower dividend payouts is larger for firms with lower expected profits, larger expected investments, and more volatile net cash flows.
Adjustment (Financing)
In sum, asymmetric information problems and other financing costs reinforce the tradeoff model's predictions about target leverage and the dividend payout ratio. Controlling for other effects, more profitable firms, firms with fewer investments, and firms with less volatile earnings and net cash flows have higher leverage and payout targets. Financing costs also impede movement toward the targets, but in contrast to the pecking order model, in the tradeoff model these costs do not overwhelm the other factors that determine target ratios.
C. Proxies for the Driving Variables
Our measures of profitability, investment opportunities, and volatility are far from perfect. We use the ratio of annual pre-tax pre-interest earnings to end-of-year total assets, ET t /A t , and the ratio of preinterest after-tax earnings to assets, E t /A t , as noisy proxies for the expected profitability of assets in place.
ET t , earnings before taxes, preferred dividends, and interest payments, is the income that could be sheltered from corporate taxes by interest deductions. Thus, ET t /A t is a good measure of profitability when we look for tax effects in the tradeoff model. ET t /A t and E t /A t also provide information about profitability for testing the pecking order model and the effects of other forces in the tradeoff model.
We use three additional proxies for expected profitability, (i) the ratio of annual dividends to endof-year book equity, D t /BE t , (ii) the ratio of total firm market value to book value, V t /A t , and (iii) book leverage, L t /A t (the ratio of debt to the book value of assets). D t /BE t is a proxy for profitability because firms with higher current and expected earnings are likely to have higher dividends. But D t /BE t is a noisy proxy because dividends also depend on payout policy. The market-to-book ratio, V t /A t , measures both the profitability of assets in place and investment opportunities. A firm's market value, V t , is the value of its assets in place plus the value of its future investments. Thus, V t /A t (a rough measure of Tobin's Q) tends to be higher for firms with more profitable assets in place and for firms with better investment opportunities. Finally, the appendix shows that like D t /BE t and V t /A t , L t /A t is a proxy for profitability.
Specifically, more levered firms tend to be less profitable.
The growth in assets, dA t /A t = (A t -A t-1 )/A t , is a direct measure of current investment. If investment is persistent, dA t /A t is also a proxy for expected investment opportunities. Since research and development expenditures generate future investment, we use the ratio of R&D to assets, RD t /A t , as an additional proxy for expected investment. RD t /A t also serves as a proxy for non-debt tax shields, along with the ratio of depreciation expense to assets (Dp t /A t ). Finally, the appendix shows that like V t /A t , D t /ME t (the ratio of dividends to the market value of common stock) is a proxy for investment opportunities; firms with higher market values relative to dividends have better investment opportunities.
The tradeoff and pecking order models predict that firms with more volatile earnings and net cash flows have less leverage and lower dividend payouts. Using time-series data to estimate volatility would limit our annual samples of firms. Instead, we assume that larger more diversified firms are likely to have less volatile earnings and net cash flows, and we use firm size -specifically, the natural logarithm of total book assets, ln(A t ) -as a proxy for volatility. We recognize, however, that size may also proxy for other factors (like ease of access to capital markets) that affect financing decisions.
Our tests exclude financial firms and utilities. Compustat's historical coverage of financial firms is thin, and financial intermediaries seem in any case inappropriate subjects for testing the predictions of leverage models. We exclude utilities to avoid the criticism that their financing decisions are a byproduct of regulation. We can report, however, that including utilities has little effect on the results.
D. Market or Book Leverage
Do the leverage predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order models describe market leverage, L t /V t (the ratio of debt to the market value of assets), or book leverage, L t /A t ? We argue that most of the predictions of the two models apply to book leverage, but they sometimes carry over to market leverage.
In the tradeoff model, agency costs, taxes, and bankruptcy costs push firms to increase debt as earnings increase. Thus, scaling earnings and debt by assets, the model predicts a positive relation between profitability, ET t /A t , and book leverage, L t /A t . Since market value increases with profitability, this positive relation does not necessarily carry over to market leverage, L t /V t . Controlling for earnings on assets in place, firms with more investment opportunities have less free cash flow and lower optimal levels of debt. Thus, scaling debt and investment with assets, the predicted relation between book leverage and investment is negative. Since market value grows at least in proportion to profitable investment outlays, the relation between investment opportunities and market leverage is also negative.
In the pecking order model, firms with lots of profits and few investments have little debt. Or, standardizing by book assets, firms with high profitability, given their investments, have less book leverage. Since market value increases with profitability, the negative relation between profitability and book leverage, L t /A t , also holds for market leverage, L t /V t . In the simple version of the pecking order, the level of a firm's debt is determined by accumulated differences between retained earnings and investment. Thus, scaling by assets, and assuming investment and earnings are persistent, the marginal relation between investment and book leverage is positive. There is no prediction about market leverage.
In the more complex pecking order model, firms balance current and expected financing costs in making leverage decisions. Firms with larger expected investments are pushed toward keeping more lowrisk debt capacity to finance anticipated investments. The under-investment and asset substitution problems that can arise with risky debt in the tradeoff model lead to a similar prediction. The result is likely to be a negative relation between leverage and expected investment. Whether this prediction applies to book or market leverage depends on whether low risk debt capacity is a function of the book or the market value of assets, an issue on which there is ambiguity. When larger expected investments lead to less book leverage, they also produce less market leverage if the investments are expected to be profitable and so add to current market value. But when low risk debt capacity depends on market value, the resulting negative relation between market leverage and expected investment opportunities does not necessarily carry over to book leverage.
Finally, for ease of reference in the discussion of empirical results that follows, appendix Chart 1 summarizes the predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order models.
III. Dividend Regressions
The tests of tradeoff and pecking order predictions about dividends build on Lintner's (1956) model, which seems to provide a good description of dividend behavior [Allen and Michaely (1995) ].
The model says that a firm has a long-term target payout ratio, TP, that relates its target dividend for year t+1, TD t+1 , to common stock earnings, Y t+1 ,
(1) TD t+1 = TP*Y t+1 .
Because of adjustment costs, the firm moves only part way to the target in year t+1,
Thus, the speed of adjustment, SOA = -a 2 , is less than 1.0.
A. The Target Payout
Approach -Our approach to modeling the target payout in (1) is like that used later to model target leverage. Each year we estimate a cross-section regression of dividends (scaled by assets) on earnings (also scaled by assets), allowing the earnings slope to vary across firms as a function of proxies for investment opportunities, profitability, and volatility, the driving forces in the tradeoff and pecking order models,
To simplify the notation, we omit the firm subscript that should appear on the variables and residuals in (4) and the year subscript that should appear on the regression coefficients. We put earnings on the right of regression (4), rather than in the denominator on the left, to avoid the influential observation problem that would arise when earnings are near zero. Most of the explanatory variables in (4) are scaled by assets or book equity. This can create influential observations when A t and BE t are close to zero. To address this issue, each year we drop firms with A t less than $2.5 million or BE t less than $0.5 million. This causes the average number of firms per regression to drop from 1571 to 1549.
The choice of interaction variables in (4) is motivated by the evidence in the appendix that V t /A t , dA t /A t , D t /ME t , and RD t /A t are proxies for investment opportunities, and V t /A t , L t /A t , and D t /BE t are proxies for the profitability of assets in place. The log of firm size, ln(A t ), is our proxy for volatility.
RDD t is a dummy that is 1.0 for firms with no reported R&D. On average more than 40 percent of
Compustat firms report no R&D, and it seems appropriate to allow for a non-linearity in the relation between R&D and dividends produced by this large group of firms.
Previous research on the Lintner (1956) model [Fama and Babiak (1968) , Choe (1990) ] finds that dividends adjust slowly toward target payouts; the speed of adjustment in (2) is far from 1.0. Slow adjustment implies that, for the purpose of modeling the long-term target payout, there is noise in the dividend variable on the left of regression (4). As long as this noise is unrelated to the explanatory variables on the right, however, it does not bias the slopes, and the regression yields unbiased estimates of the long-term target payout ratio as a function of investment opportunities, profitability, and volatility.
In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973), we use averages of the annual slopes from (4) and time-series standard errors of the averages to draw inferences. The advantage of this approach is that the year-by-year variation in the slopes, which determines the standard errors of the average slopes, includes estimation error due to the correlation of the residuals across firms. The standard errors are also robust with respect to heteroscedasticity, since there is no heteroscedasticity correction for a sample mean.
Autocorrelation of the annual slopes is also an issue. The first-order autocorrelations are often large, 0.2 to 0.5. (Higher-order autocorrelations are typically close to zero.) We could adjust the standard errors of the average slopes for the estimated autocorrelation of the slopes. But with just 33 observations on the slopes for 1965-97, autocorrelation estimates are imprecise, with standard errors around 0.18. We use a less formal approach. We assume that all but the first-order autocorrelations of the annual slopes are zero, and, to be conservative, we assume that the first-order autocorrelations are 0.5 (which is at the high end of the autocorrelations we observe). This implies that the actual variance of each average slope is approximately twice the variance calculated assuming serial independence of the annual slopes, so the standard error of the average slopes, calculated assuming serial independence, should be inflated by 40%.
Thus we require t-statistics greater than 2.8, rather than the usual 2.0, to infer reliability.
Results -In the tradeoff model, firms with more investments relative to earnings have lower free cash flows and thus less need for discipline from dividends. Lower dividends for firms with more investments also help avoid the asset substitution and under-investment problems that can arise if investment is instead financed with risky debt. In the pecking order model, firms with abundant investments relative to earnings pay fewer dividends to preserve low-risk debt capacity for current and expected investment. Thus, both models predict that, controlling for the profitability of assets in place, firms with more investment opportunities have lower dividend payouts. The negative average dA t /A t slope (t = -3.91) and the negative average RD t /A t slope (t = -3.06) produced by the estimates of (4) in Table 1 support this prediction. The positive D t /ME t slope (t = 3.86) also supports the prediction since firms with higher values of D t /ME t have fewer investment opportunities.
In the tradeoff model, firms with more profitable assets in place have more need for the discipline of dividends to control the agency problem created by their free cash flows. In the pecking order model, more profitable assets allow firms to pay higher dividends while maintaining low risk debt capacity to finance investment. Thus, the reasons are again different, but both models predict that given investment opportunities, more profitable firms have higher dividend payout ratios. The positive D t /BE t slope (t = 10.99) and the negative L t /A t slope (t = -10.90) produced by the estimates of (4) in Table 1 are in line with this prediction. (Firms with higher D t /BE t tend to be more profitable and profitability is negatively related to book leverage.) The positive V t /A t slope (t = 2.55) also supports the prediction that more profitable firms choose higher target payouts if the slope is due to the information about profitability in V t /A t rather than to information about investment opportunities.
In the tradeoff model, more volatile earnings imply lower expected tax rates and higher expected bankruptcy costs, which push firms toward less leverage and lower dividend payouts. In the complex pecking order model, more volatile net cash flows push firms toward lower dividend payouts and less leverage by raising the chance that low-risk debt capacity will not be available for future investments.
The positive ln(A t ) slope (t=7.90) in the estimates of (4) is consistent with the prediction that more volatile (i.e., smaller) firms have lower dividend payouts. But we recognize that size may also proxy for other factors (like the cost of accessing outside capital markets) that affect dividend decisions.
The appendix shows that D t /ME t and D t /BE t are positively related to the payout ratio, D t /Y t . One might then worry that the explanatory power of D t /ME t and D t /BE t in (4) is not due to the fact that D t /ME t is also a proxy for investment opportunities and D t /BE t is a proxy for profitability. But if true, this argument implies that the explanatory power of other profitability and investment proxies is under-stated. Other evidence suggests that the explanatory power of D t /ME t and D t /BE t in (4) traces at least in part to information about investment opportunities (D t /ME t ) and profitability (D t /BE t ). When D t /ME t alone is dropped from (4), the major effect is to kill the slope on V t /A t . The appendix shows that V t /A t is positively related to both investment opportunities and the profitability of assets in place. When D t /ME t and V t /A t are both in (4), the slope on V t /A t can concentrate more on the information in V t /A t about profitability. And as predicted by the tradeoff and pecking order models, the V t /A t slope is positive.
When D t /ME t is dropped, V t /A t must also pick up some of the information in D t /ME t about investment opportunities. The slope near zero on V t /A t is then consistent with the tradeoff and pecking order predictions that more profitable assets in place lead to higher dividend payouts, but better investments produce lower payouts. Similarly, when D t /BE t alone is dropped from (4), the main effects are large increases in the V t /A t slope (from 0.009 to 0.053) and the D t /ME t slope (from 1.20 to 3.98). This suggests that when D t /BE t is dropped from (4), its information about profitability is picked up by V t /A t , and part of the information in V t /A t about investment opportunities moves to D t /ME t .
If leverage and the dividend payout are jointly determined, including leverage as an explanatory variable in (4) leads to an endogeneity problem. Table 1 shows, however, that when L t /A t alone is dropped from (4), the slopes on the remaining variables do not change sign or become statistically unreliable, so our inferences are unaffected.
The main effect of dropping L t /A t from (4) is a more than doubling of the slope on V t /A t . This suggests that the slope on L t /A t traces at least in part to the information in book leverage about the profitability of assets in place. And note that the observed negative marginal relation between leverage and the payout ratio is in the spirit of both the tradeoff model (higher leverage obviates the need for the disciplinary benefits of dividends) and the pecking order model (firms with more debt pay less dividends to avoid issuing risky securities).
In short, as predicted by the tradeoff and pecking order models, the dividend payout ratio is positively related to profitability and negatively related to investment opportunities. These results are new. Previous work on dividends never directly attempts to explain the payout ratio. For example, Smith and Watts (1992) find that D t /ME t (the dividend yield, not the dividend payout ratio) is negatively related to investment opportunities, measured as V t /A t . This is not surprising, given that the variation in both variables is primarily due to the stock price in ME t and V t . Indeed, we argue that because most of the variation in D t /ME t comes from the stock price, D t /ME t (like V t /A t ) is a proxy for investment opportunities.
B. Dividends and Investment
The estimates of (4) support tradeoff and pecking order predictions about how investment, profitability, and volatility affect target dividend payouts. We now examine whether firms vary dividends away from their targets to accommodate short-term variation in investment. In these tests, we turn to Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment equation (3), which includes normal variation in dividends due to movement toward the target payout. We use two versions of (3). The simple version does not allow for variation across firms in the target payout and speed of adjustment of (2) and (3). Specifically, adding a constant to (3) and scaling by total assets, each year we estimate the cross-section regression, In dynamic models like (5), the average slopes from year-by-year Fama-MacBeth cross-section regressions are like the slopes from a panel (pooled time-series cross-section) regression that weights years equally and allows the means of the variables to change across years (which we think is sensible).
An advantage of the FM approach is that it does not require a constant panel of firms for our 33-year period, which largely eliminates survivor bias and allows us to use huge annual samples (an average of 1549 firms per regression). As a result, the average slope on concurrent investment, dA t+1 /A t = (A t+1 -A t )/A t in (5), produces a powerful test of how dividends respond to short-term variation in investment.
And as usual, the standard errors of the average slopes allow for whatever contributes to the precision of the slopes.
Average slopes from the year-by-year estimates of (5) are in Regression (5) is mispecified. The target payout and speed of adjustment of the Lintner model surely vary across firms. The tradeoff and pecking order models predict that the payout ratio depends on investment opportunities, the profitability of assets in place, and volatility. To allow variation across firms in TP and SOA, we expand regression (4) to include interaction terms that allow the slopes on Y t+1 /A t and D t /A t to vary as functions of proxies for investment opportunities, profitability, and volatility, The proxy variables in (6) are the same as those used to model the target payout in (4). Since the target payout in the Lintner model depends on the slopes for Y t+1 /A t and D t /A t , both slopes are allowed to vary with the proxies for profitability and investment opportunities. Moreover, it seems reasonable that variables that help determine TP may also have a role in SOA.
Our main interest in (6) is not what the slopes on the interaction variables say about the target payout and the speed of adjustment of the Lintner model. Indeed, without going into details, using the interaction variables in (6) to draw inferences about the target payout is hopeless because TP depends in a complicated way on the slopes on the Y t+1 /A t and the D t /A t interaction variables. In Table 2 , we bypass messy and uninteresting details, and report overall Y t+1 /A t and D t /A t slopes that aggregate the interaction slopes in (6). (See Table 2 for details.) We can then focus on our main interest, the information from the dA t+1 /A t slope about the short-term response of dividends to investment.
The cross-section estimates of the Lintner model from (6) in Table 2 are reassuring on several counts. Like (5), (6) What do regressions (5) and (6) say about short-term variation in dividends in response to investment? The average dA t+1 /A t slope from (6) in Table 2 is negative, which suggests some accommodation. But the slope is zero up to four decimal places (t = -0.23). The dA t+1 /A t slope in (5), which does not allow variation across firms in SOA and TP, is a bit further from zero. But it is statistically unreliable (t = -1.28) and economically trivial; on average, the change in dividends absorbs about 0.2 percent of the change in assets. And the problem is not statistical power. The fact that a slope as small as -0.002 is -1.28 standard errors from zero says that the regressions have power to identify meaningful variation in dividends in response to investment -if it is there.
In the pecking order model, financing with retained earnings avoids the asymmetric information problem that arises when firms issue risky debt or equity. The model thus seems to predict that firms adjust dividends to absorb short-term variation in investment. But this prediction is not firm. The estimates of (4) say that, as predicted by the model, firms with more investments choose lower target payouts. If this negative relation between investment and long-term payouts leaves dividend payers with enough retained earnings and low risk debt capacity to absorb variation in investment, the insensitivity of dividends to investment does not violate the pecking order. The appendix shows that for different groups of dividend payers net issues of stock are small and of random sign. For the 1965-97 period, dividend payers as a group are on average net repurchasers of stock. In short, consistent with the pecking order model, firms do not typically pay dividends and issue stock.
Note, though, that in a pecking order world, the non-response of dividends to short-term variation in investment does imply that the adjustment costs (asymmetric information problems and other financing costs) of varying dividends are larger than for debt.
It is widely acknowledged that dividends are insensitive to short-term variation in investment [Myers (1984) , Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ]. But the only evidence we are aware of is Fama (1974).
We extend Fama's (1974) results, obtained from time-series tests of the Lintner model on a limited sample of large firms, to a later time period and annual samples that include all dividend-paying firms.
IV. Leverage Regressions
Our final tests attempt to explain the behavior of leverage. We address three questions. The framework for the tests is a standard partial adjustment model in which the change in book leverage partially absorbs the difference between target leverage, E(L t+1 /A t+1 ), and lagged leverage, L t /A t ,
Z is a vector of current and past investment and earnings, included to test whether these variables produce temporary movement in leverage away from its target.
We estimate (7) with a two-step cross-section regression approach. Each year t+1, we first regress book leverage L t+1 /A t+1 on the variables assumed to determine target leverage, We then use the fitted values from (8) for year t+1 as the proxy for E(L t+1 /A t+1 ) in the second-stage estimate of (7) for t+1. In the market leverage model, we substitute L t+1 /V t+1 for L t+1 /A t+1 in (7) and (8).
The partial adjustment framework of (7) and (8) nests the tradeoff and pecking order models. In the trade-off model, firms have leverage targets and they move toward the targets every period. The fitted values from (8) are estimates of the targets, and the speed-of-adjustment a 1 in (7) measures how adjustment costs slow the movement of leverage toward its target. In contrast, in the pecking order model, the costs of issuing new risky securities swamp all other forces. As a result, firms do not have leverage targets, and regression (8) simply describes how leverage varies across firms as a function of profitability, investment opportunities, and firm size. The simple pecking order model predicts that in the estimates of (7) the speed-of-adjustment, a 1 , is indistinguishable from zero, whereas the tradeoff model says it is reliably positive. Finally, because dividends are sticky and the costs of adjusting debt are less than the costs of adjusting equity, the pecking order model predicts a strong short-term response of leverage to short-term variation in earnings and investment (the Z variables in (7)).
The explanatory variables for the level of leverage in the tradeoff and pecking order models are the profitability of assets in place, investment opportunities, non-debt tax shields, and the volatility of earnings and net cash flows. Our proxies for profitability in (8) are ET t /A t , V t /A t , and D t /BE t . The proxies for investment opportunities are V t /A t , D t /ME t , and RD t /A t . RD t is also a proxy for non-debt tax shields, along with depreciation, Dp t /A t . We use the log of assets, ln(A t ) to proxy for volatility.
Since dividends and leverage are likely to be jointly determined, including D t /BE t and D t /ME t in the leverage regressions creates a potential endogeneity problem. Thus, we also show estimates of (8) for dividend payers that exclude the dividend variables. This regression for payers then has the same explanatory variables as the regression for non-payers. Suffice it to say that excluding the dividend variables from the payer regressions has little effect on the coefficients of other variables (the exception is noted below) and never changes our inferences. Excluding the dividend variables from regression (8) also has little effect on the estimates of (7). Finally, the explanatory variables in (8) are predetermined.
This mitigates any endogeneity problems in the relations between leverage and its determinants.
A. Comments on Methodology
Variants of the target leverage regression (8) are common in the literature. Estimation of (8) with a single cross-section regression is typical [e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) ]. Panel (pooled time-series cross-section) regressions are the weapon of choice in partial adjustment models like (7) [Auerbach (1984) , Jalilvand and Harris (1984) , ShyamSunder and Myers (1999) ]. In the earlier work that uses a single cross-section regression, the inference problem created by correlation of the regression residuals across firms is ignored. The papers that use panel regressions ignore both the cross-correlation problem and the potential inference problem caused by autocorrelation of the regression residuals.
We estimate (7) and (8) Autocorrelation of the slopes from the annual cross-section regressions is also a problem. In the regression (8) to explain the level of leverage, the first-order autocorrelations of the annual slopes are typically above 0.4 and they sometimes reach 0.8. The autocorrelations for longer lags decay, but they are sometimes around 0.5 out to three lags. Autocorrelation of the annual slopes is less serious in the regression (7) to explain changes in leverage. The first-order autocorrelations of the slopes in these regressions are rarely greater than 0.5, and higher-order autocorrelations are typically close to zero.
As in the dividend regressions, we use a conservative approach to account for the autocorrelation of the year-by-year regression slopes. We assume the standard errors of the average slopes in (8) should be inflated by a factor of 2.5. Thus, we require t-statistics around 5.0, rather than the usual 2.0, to infer reliability. This adjustment is exact if the annual slopes are first-order autoregressions with first-order autocorrelation of about 0.75, which is at the high end of the observed range. Similarly, we assume the standard errors of the average slopes in (7), calculated assuming serial independence of the annual slopes, should be inflated by about 40 percent. Thus, we require t-statistics around 2.8 to infer reliability. This adjustment is exact if first-order autocorrelation of the annual slopes is the only problem, and the autocorrelation is 0.5, which again is at the high end of the observed range.
Note that these autocorrelation adjustments are in addition to the implicit adjustment for crosscorrelation provided by the Fama-MacBeth standard errors. Again, both adjustments are missing in previous work. Thus, though many of our leverage results are in line with previous evidence, our approach adds statistical credibility that is currently missing. Table 3 shows average slopes from variants of regression (8). Since the pecking order mode l suggests that the relation between leverage and investment differs for dividend payers and non-payers, separate regressions are shown for the two groups. The payer samples in the leverage regressions of Table 3 match those in the dividend regressions of Tables 1 and 2.
B. The Level of Leverage

Leverage and Profitability
In the tradeoff model, agency costs, taxes, and bankruptcy costs push more profitable firms toward higher book leverage. In contrast, in the pecking order model, higher earnings result in less book and market leverage.
The regressions in Table 3 support the profitability prediction of the pecking order model. In the estimates of (8) to explain the market leverage of dividend payers, the average slope on profitability, ET t /A t , is -0.85 (t = -19.92). The slopes for the two additional proxies for the profitability of assets in place, V t /A t and D t /BE t , are also negative. The average V t /A t slope is -12.57 standard errors from zero, but the D t /BE t slope does not clear our five standard error hurdle (t = -4.29). In the estimates of (8) to explain the market leverage of non-payers, the average ET t /A t and V t /A t slopes are again negative, and -11.81 and -12.92 standard errors from zero. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) also report that more profitable firms have less market leverage.
In the book leverage versions of (8), the average ET t /A t slopes are strongly negative for dividend payers and non-payers (t-statistics from -14.10 to -19.36). In the full version of (8) for dividend payers, the V t /A t slope is also reliably negative (t = -9.19). The V t /A t slope in the book leverage regression for non-payers is negative and close (t = -4.92) to our five standard error reliability bound. The positive D t /BE t slope (t = 8.27) in the full regression for dividend payers leans in the other direction, but on balance the regressions suggest that more profitable firms have less book leverage. Long and Malitz (1985) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) also report that book leverage is negatively related to profitability.
We worry that the ET t /A t slope in (8) overstates the long-term relation between leverage and profitability. The estimates of the partial adjustment model (7) will show that there is a strong offsetting response of leverage to changes in earnings. It is thus possible that the negative ET t /A t slopes in (8) in part pick up transitory variation in leverage rather than variation in target leverage. Note, however, that this is a problem for interpreting the ET t /A t slopes as tests of the predictions of the tradeoff model about target leverage. But it is not a problem for the pecking order model, which predicts that earnings indeed generate opposite variation in leverage in the short-term as well as in the long-term.
There is, however, evidence that the ET t /A t slopes are informative about the relation between expected profitability and leverage. V t /A t is a profitability proxy that is not likely to be sensitive to the transitory component of current profitability. Dropping ET t /A t from (8) causes the slopes on V t /A t to become much more negative (Table 3 ). This suggests that ET t /A t contains information about the expected profitability of assets in place that must be picked up by V t /A t when ET t /A t is not in the regression. [We can also report that using the version of (8) that excludes ET t /A t from the estimates of target leverage has little effect on the coefficient estimates for (7).]
In short, the marginal relation between profitability and leverage (market or book) is negative.
This supports the pecking order prediction that higher profitability is used to keep leverage low. But it is bad news for the tradeoff model's prediction that, given investment opportunities, more profitable firms have more book leverage. The negative relation between profitability and leverage is, however, possibly consistent with an agency cost story in which entrenched managers forego value-maximizing leverage to have more free cash flow at their disposal.
Leverage and Investment Opportunities
The tradeoff model predicts that, controlling for the profitability of assets in place, firms with more investment opportunities have less leverage because (i) they have stronger incentives to avoid under-investment and asset substitution inefficiencies that can arise from stockholder-bondholder agency problems, and (ii) they have less need for the discipline of debt payments to control free cash flow problems. The complex version of the pecking order model also predicts a negative relation between leverage and expected investment opportunities (especially for dividend payers), but the prediction is based on the desire to have more low-risk debt capacity available to finance expected investments. In contrast, the simple version of the pecking order predicts a positive marginal relation between leverage and investment. Table 3 produces weak evidence that dividend payers with more investments have less book leverage. The slopes on V t /A t (t = -9.19) and RD t /A t (t = -7.58) in the book leverage version of (8) for dividend payers are reliably negative, but they are offset by the negative D t /ME t slope (t = -7.08). The RD t /A t slope remains reliably negative (t = -6.45) when D t /ME t is dropped from the regression, but the V t /A t slope dies (t = -0.29). The full book leverage regression for non-payers provides more consistent support for a negative marginal relation between book leverage and investment opportunities. Like all the regressions, the non-payer book leverage regression produces a strong negative average slope on RD t /A t (t = -8.00), and the V t /A t slope is close to our five standard error bound for reliability (t = -4.92).
Better investments are, however, associated with less market leverage for dividend payers as well as for non-payers. In the estimates of the full version of (8) to explain the market leverage of dividend payers, the slopes on V t /A t and RD t /A t are strongly negative (t = -12.57 and t = -11.03). For non-payers, the V t /A t and RD t /A t slopes are -12.92 and -5.70 standard errors from zero. The positive average D t /ME t slope (t = 5.54) in the regressions for dividend payers also supports a negative relation between market leverage and investment opportunities since firms with low D t /ME t have better investments.
In sum, there is no support for the prediction of the simple pecking order model that firms with more investments have more book leverage. The regressions tend to support the negative relation between book leverage and investment opportunities predicted by the tradeoff model and by the complex pecking order model in which debt capacity depends on the book value of assets. The stronger evidence that firms with more investments have less market leverage is also consistent with these models and with a complex pecking order in which debt capacity depends on the market value of assets. But there is a more prosaic story for the negative relation between market leverage and investment opportunities. It may be a mechanical result of better investments producing higher market values, rather than the workings of the tradeoff and pecking order models. [Titman and Wessels (1988) make a related point.]
The negative relation between leverage and R&D observed in our tests is a common result [Bradley, Jarrel, and Kim (1984) , Long and Malitz (1985) , Titman and Wessels (1988) ]. Like us, Rajan and Zingales (1995) find a negative relation between leverage and investment opportunities, proxied by the market-to-book ratio. But Titman and Wessels (1988) find no reliable relation between leverage and their measures of growth opportunities.
Leverage, Volatility, and Non-Debt Tax Shields
The tradeoff model predicts that because firms with more non-debt tax shields (e.g., deductions
for depreciation and R&D) have lower expected tax rates, they have less book leverage. The regressions in Table 3 support this prediction. The RD t /A t slopes in the book (and market) leverage regressions for dividend payers and non-payers are all negative; in the full regressions, they are more than -5.6 standard errors from zero. [As an aside, there is indeed nonlinearity in the relation between leverage and R&D.
The positive RDD t slopes say that the average leverage of firms that report no R&D is 0.03 to 0.07 higher (t-statistics greater than 5.6) than predicted by the RD t /A t slopes.] In the book leverage estimates of the full regression (8) for dividend payers, the average depreciation (Dp t /A t ) slope is negative (t = -11.19).
The DP t /A t slope for non-payers is also negative, but it is only -2.72 standard errors from zero.
The tradeoff model predicts that firms with less variable earnings have more leverage. The complex pecking order model predicts a negative relation between the volatility of net cash flows and leverage. We hypothesize that larger firms have less volatile earnings and net cash flows. Confirming much previous work [see Harris and Raviv (1991) ] and the predictions of the models, the ln(A t ) slopes in (8) are all positive and more than 13.9 standard errors from zero. We acknowledge, however, that the positive relation between size and leverage may also be the result of factors other than volatility. For example, it seems likely that large firms access the debt market at lower cost than small firms.
C. Is Leverage Mean-Reverting?
Panels A and B of Table 4 summarize the second-stage estimates of the partial adjustment model (7) for market and book leverage. The estimates suggest that, as predicted by the tradeoff model, leverage is mean reverting. The average slopes on the proxies for target market and book leverage, E(L t /V t ) and E(L t /A t ), are positive. And the large t-statistics (12.33 to 16.24) on the target leverage slopes suggest that the fitted values from the first-stage estimates of (8) capture meaningful differences in target leverage across firms. As predicted by the partial adjustment model, the average slopes on L t /V t and L t /A t in the estimates of (7) are negative (t-statistics from -10.29 to -22.03), and the slopes on E(L t /V t ) and L t /V t [or E(L t /A t ) and L t /A t ] are close in absolute value. The mean reversion of leverage is, however, at a snail's pace, nine to 13 percent per year for dividend payers and 13 to 20 percent for non-payers.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that a pecking order world in which firms do not have leverage targets can generate a false appearance that leverage is slowly mean-reverting simply because of autocorrelated variation in net cash flows. Given their caveat, the statistically reliable but slow mean reversion of leverage that we observe may not be much support for the tradeoff model.
D. Debt, Earnings, and Investment
The pecking order model says that dividends are (for unknown reasons) sticky. Since financing costs are higher for equity than for debt, the model predicts that short-term variation in earnings and investment is largely absorbed by debt. The slopes for the Z variables in (7) (8) to judge how taxes affect long-term leverage, but after tax earnings are relevant in (7) for measuring short-term variation in leverage in response to the earnings available to firms.]
Leverage clearly varies to absorb changes in earnings; the average dE t+1 /A t slopes in (7) are -10.29 to -31.13 standard errors from zero (Panels A and B of Table 4 ). There is an additional lagged response of leverage to earnings; the dE t /A t slopes are -5.55 to -14.62 standard errors from zero. A likely explanation is that because debt cannot vary quickly at low cost, there is some spillover from one year to the next in the response of leverage to earnings. There is also strong evidence that investment produces concurrent variation in leverage. The average slopes on dA t+1 /A t in Table 4 are positive and 7.99 to 16.92 standard errors from zero. Any lagged response of leverage to investment is weak. The average slopes on dA t /A t are small and they have opposite signs in the book and market leverage regressions.
The strong response of leverage to short-term variation in investment explains why we do not include investment as an explanatory variable in (8), which attempts to identify the determinants of longterm leverage. We can report that adding investment to (8) does typically produce reliably positive slopes. This is in contrast to the negative slopes on V t /A t and RD t /A t , which are proxies for long-term investment opportunities. In other words, as predicted by the complex pecking order model, in the near term leverage moves in the same direction as investment, but the relation between leverage and long-term expected investment opportunities tends to be negative.
To measure the dollar response of debt to earnings and investment, Panel C of Table 4 shows estimates of (7) in which the dependent variable is the scaled change in debt, dL t+1 /A t = (L t+1 -L t )/A t , rather than the change in leverage, d(L t+1 /A t+1 ) = L t+1 /A t+1 -L t /A t . Debt has a big role in financing investment.
The regressions for the change in debt say that, controlling for changes in earnings, dividend payers finance 82 percent (t = 47.65) of current investment with debt, with a six percent reversal (t = -8.89) the following year. Controlling for changes in earnings, non-payers finance 71 percent (t = 24.57) of investment with debt, with a five percent reversal (t = -5.14) the following year. Thus, variation in investment produces a bigger change in debt for dividend payers than for non-payers. This is consistent with the evidence in Fama and French (2000) and appendix Tables A1 and A2 that net new issues of equity are trivial for payers but more important for non-payers. The fact that short-term variation in investment is mostly absorbed by debt is consistent with the pecking order model.
In the regressions for the change in debt, the slopes on current and lagged earnings changes are for non-payers. It is a bit strange that, controlling for investment, a $1 increase in earnings produces combined concurrent and lagged declines in debt of $0.99 for dividend payers and $0.72 for non-payers.
We anticipated a larger response for non-payers since payers are more likely to in part absorb earnings changes with dividend changes. Sampling error and regression mis-specification are likely explanations.
At a minimum, however, it is safe to conclude that, as predicted by the pecking order model, much of the short-term variation in earnings is absorbed by debt.
The pecking order model does predict that changes in earnings are largely absorbed by changes in debt. But it also predicts that, given investment, variation in the level of earnings generates opposite variation in debt. Thus one can argue that the concurrent level of (scaled) earnings, E t+1 /A t , should replace the change in earnings, dE t+1 /A t , for measuring the change in debt in response to variation in earnings. We can report that when we make this substitution, the slopes on E t+1 /A t [-.75 (t = -31.38) for dividend payers and -.62 (t = 10.57) for non-payers] are close to the slopes for dE t+1 /A t in Table 4 [-.70 (t = -26.95) and -.53 (t = -10.72)]. We prefer the change in earnings as the explanatory variable since it in effect uses the firm's most recent earnings as the base for measuring variation in earnings. In contrast, using E t+1 /A t as the explanatory variable uses the cross-section mean of scaled earnings as the base.
Finally, our estimates of the slow rate of mean reversion of leverage and the strong short-term response of debt to earnings and investment are similar to those of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) .
They use panel (pooled time-series cross-section) regressions and the rather small sample of 157 firms that have complete Compustat data for 1971-89 on the variables they require. Our approach, a time-series of year-by-year cross-section regressions, allows us to use much larger samples of firms (an average of 1549 for dividend payers and 1295 for non-payers) and produces more reliable standard errors for the regression coefficients. Still, it is comforting that the two approaches yield similar results.
V. Conclusions
Who wins the confrontation between the tradeoff and pecking order models? On many issues there is no conflict. Though motivated by different forces, the two models share many predictions about dividends and leverage. These shared predictions tend to be confirmed in our tests. For example, the two models predict that controlling for other effects, more profitable firms have higher dividend payouts, and firms with more investments have lower payouts. The dividend regressions (Table 1 ) support these predictions.
Similarly, controlling for profitability, the tradeoff model posits that firms with larger profitable investments have less book and market leverage. A complex version of the pecking order model also predicts a negative relation between expected investment opportunities and leverage (book and/or market, depending on whether debt capacity is determined by the book or market value of assets). Our tests (Table 3) The tradeoff and pecking order models do disagree on two important issues. On one, the evidence favors the pecking order model. On the other, the tests are inconclusive.
Specifically, controlling for investment opportunities, the tradeoff model predicts that more profitable firms have more book leverage. The pecking order model predicts that more profitable firms have less book and market leverage. The leverage regressions in Table 3 support the pecking order model. This is the important failure of the tradeoff model.
In the tradeoff model, firms have well-defined leverage targets, and leverage moves inexorably toward its target. In the simple pecking order model, firms do not have leverage targets and leverage is not mean reverting. Our results on these predictions are difficult to interpret. The regressions in Table 4 produce statistically reliable evidence that leverage is mean reverting. But the rate of mean reversion is suspiciously slow (nine to 20 percent per year). Such slow mean reversion may be the spurious result of autocorrelated variation in net cash flows [Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ] or perhaps of the soft leverage targets suggested by the complex version of the pecking order model.
Our tests produce a clear story about short-term financing decisions in response to earnings and investment. For dividend payers, it is a pecking order story. The pecking order model posits that dividends are sticky, leaving variation in earnings and investment to be absorbed largely by debt.
Appendix Table A1 shows that net new issues of common stock are trivial for dividend payers, which is consistent with the pecking order. The dividend regressions (Table 2) say that long-term dividend policy conforms to the Lintner model, and there is little evidence that dividends vary to accommodate short-term variation in investment. The leverage and debt regressions ( Table 4 ) then confirm that, for dividend payers, debt is indeed the residual variable in financing decisions.
Like dividend payers, non-payers primarily use debt to absorb short-term variation in earnings and investment. But, confirming the evidence in Fama and French (2000) , appendix Table A2 shows that non-payers finance more of their investments with net new issues of equity. This is in line with the pecking order if the new issues of equity are done in extremis. The appendix shows, however, that the opposite is true; the least levered non-payers (typically small growth firms) make the largest net new issues of equity. As a group, however, non-payers are only about 20 percent of aggregate assets at the end of our sample period; they are even less important in earlier years. [See Fama and French (2000) .]
And the less levered non-payers that do not follow pecking order precepts are a subset of non-payers.
One can reasonably argue that a model that captures the financing decisions of firms that account for more than 80 percent of assets stands high in the pantheon of empirically successful theories.
In sum, we identify one scar on the tradeoff model (the negative relation between leverage and profitability), one blemish on the pecking order model (the large equity issues of small low-leverage growth firms), and one important area of conflict (the mean reversion of leverage) on which the data speak at best softly. The many shared predictions of the two models do quite well in our tests.
Appendix Data and Variable Definitions
Each fiscal year t+1 from 1965 to 1997 we screen Compustat for firms that have data for years t+1, t, and t-1 on the following required variables (Compustat data item): total assets (6), liabilities (181), stock price (199) and shares outstanding (25) at the end of the fiscal year, income before extraordinary items (18), income before extraordinary items available for common (237), interest expense (15), depreciation expense (14), tax expense (16), common stock dividends (21), and preferred stock liquidating value (10) and/or preferred stock redemption value (56) and/or preferred stock carrying value (130). We also include, but do not require, data for years t+1, t, and t-1 on balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35), income statement deferred taxes (50) and investment tax credit (51), R&D expenditures (46), purchases of common and preferred stock (115), and sales of common and preferred stock (108). Utilities (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and financial firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) are excluded from the tests.
Derived variables are:
Preferred Stock = liquidating value (10) if available, else redemption value (56) if available, else carrying value;
Market Equity (ME t ) = stock price (199) times shares outstanding (25);
Market Value of Firm (V t ) = liabilities (181) -balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35) + preferred stock + market equity;
Book Common Equity (BE t ) = assets (6) -liabilities (181) -preferred stock + balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35);
Earnings before Interest (E t ) = earnings before extraordinary items (18) + interest expense (15) + income statement deferred taxes (50) + income statement investment tax credit (51).
Earnings Available for Common (Y t ) = income before extraordinary items available for common (237) + income statement deferred taxes (50) + income statement investment tax credit (51).
Sorts
We use sorts to establish the properties of the regression variables. The sorts also produce qualitative perspective that complements the formal regression evidence on how the payout ratio and leverage vary with their theoretical determinants.
Each year we sort Compustat firms on measures of book leverage, market leverage, and some of the proposed determinants of dividends and leverage. For each sorting variable, we group firms into quintiles and calculate various aggregates for each of the five portfolios. The aggregates are the leverage and dividend payout variables to be explained and potential explanatory variables. For example, the posttax profitability of a quintile is the ratio of the aggregate earnings before interest but after taxes (E t ) of the firms in a quintile to their aggregate assets (A t ). In effect, then, a quintile is treated as one big firm.
Ratios of aggregates are also size-weighted averages of the ratios for individual firms. For example, the ratio of aggregate E t to aggregate A t is the weighted average of individual E t /A t ratios, where each firm's ratio is weighted by its assets. The time period for the sorts is 1965-97, except for stock issues and repurchases which are not on Compustat until 1971. As in the regressions, we show separate sorts for dividend payers (Table A1 ) and non-payers (Table A2 ).
The pecking order and tradeoff models make predictions about book and market leverage, and we examine sorts on both. We do not examine sorts on the payout ratio. When earnings are close to zero, the payout ratio explodes. Earnings are also more variable than dividends, and a sort on the payout ratio may largely be a sort on the temporary component of earnings rather than on the target payout. Table A1 shows, however, that two of our sorting variables, D t /ME t (the ratio of a firm's dividends for year t to the end-of-year market value of its common stock), and D t /BE t (the ratio of dividends to the book value of common equity) are related to the payout ratio. The average value of D t /Y t (the ratio of aggregate dividends to aggregate common stock earnings) varies from 0.18 in the lowest D t /ME t quintile to 0.65 in the highest. The aggregate payout ratio varies from 0.17 in the lowest D t /BE t quintile to 0.54 in the highest.
But the D t /BE t and D t /ME t sorts are not identical. Table A1 shows that D t /ME t is a proxy for investment opportunities. The D t /ME t sorts produce little variation in profitability, E t /A t , but dA t /A t (current investment), V t /A t (Tobin's Q), and RD t /A t (aggregate R&D over aggregate assets) all decline with increasing D t /ME t . Thus, firms with higher stock prices relative to dividends have more current and expected investments. In contrast, sorting on D t /BE t produces weak orderings on two of the investment proxies (V t /A t and RD t /A t ), but the D t /BE t sorts produce an ordering on profitability (E t /A t ). Thus, D t /BE t is a proxy for the profitability of assets in place.
The tradeoff and pecking order models predict that, controlling for the profitability of assets in place, firms with more investment opportunities have lower dividend payouts. The D t /ME t sorts are rough evidence on this prediction since they produce little variation in current profitability. As noted above, and confirming the more formal evidence from the dividend payout regressions (Table 1) , the D t /ME t sorts produce the predicted negative relations between the payout ratio and proxies for investment opportunities (dA t /A t , V t /A t , and RD t /A t ).
Another shared prediction of the tradeoff and pecking order models is that given investment opportunities, more profitable firms have higher dividend payouts. Most of the sorts in Table A1 produce correlated orderings on investment opportunities and profitability, so they do not provide the control for investment opportunities needed to examine the relation between profitability and dividend payout. The D t /BE t and L t /A t (book leverage) sorts are exceptions. They produce orderings on profitability, but weak orderings on proxies for investment opportunities. If anything, in the D t /BE t sorts, more profitable firms tend to invest less. The positive relation between profitability and the payout ratio in the D t /BE t sorts then suggests that when profitability does not line up with investment opportunities, more profitable firms indeed pay out more of their earnings as dividends. Unfortunately, the L t /A t sorts produce the opposite result; more profitable (less levered) firms have lower dividend payouts. The regressions (Table 1) resolve the issue -in favor of the shared prediction of the tradeoff and pecking order models that the dividend payout increases with profitability.
The pecking order model says that, given investment opportunities, more profitable firms have less book leverage, and the simple version of the model predicts that given profitability, firms with more investments have more book leverage. Since the tradeoff model predicts the opposite, leverage tests can discriminate between the two models.
For firms that do not pay dividends, profitability and investment opportunities tend to be positively correlated in every sort (Table A2) that creates large variation in either variable. Thus, even rough inferences about the marginal effects of profitability and investment opportunities on leverage are ruled out. A few of the sorts of dividend payers in Table A1 do seem to isolate differences in profitability or investment opportunities. Sorting payers on book leverage (L t /A t ) produces a large spread in current profitability, E t /A t , and little variation in two of the three measures of investment opportunities, dA t /A t and RD t /A t . Confirming the leverage regressions (Table 3) , the book leverage sorts support the pecking order model and contradict the tradeoff model. Holding investment opportunities roughly constant, more profitable dividend payers have less book and market leverage.
The dividend yield (D t /ME t ) sorts (Table A1 ) produce differences in investment opportunities (dA t /A t , RD t /A t , and V t /A t ), but profitability, measured by E t /A t , is roughly constant across D t /ME t quintiles. Since higher D t /ME t implies fewer investment opportunities, the simple version of the pecking order model predicts that book leverage falls as D t /ME t increases, while the tradeoff model predicts that book leverage increases. In fact, the D t /ME t sorts produce little variation in book leverage; all the quintile averages are between 0.53 and 0.55. Confirming the leverage regressions (Table 3) , the dividend yield sorts do produce a negative relation between investment opportunities and market leverage; L t /V t increases from 0.32 to 0.52 as D t /ME t increases. This result supports the complex pecking order model if low-risk debt capacity depends on the market value of the firm.
In the tradeoff and pecking order models, more volatile earnings and net cash flows push firms toward less leverage and lower dividend payouts. Tables A1 and A2 summarize sorts on firm size, A t , our proxy for volatility. For dividend payers, (Table A1 ) size is not much related to profitability (E t /A t )
or investment opportunities (V t /A t , RD t /A t , and dA t /A t ). But confirming previous work [e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995) ] and the regressions in Table 3 , size is related to leverage (book or market). Larger dividend payers have more leverage. The size sorts of non-payers in Table A2 produce more variation in profitability and investment, but they also suggest a positive relation between leverage and size.
The evidence from the sorts that larger firms choose higher dividend payouts is less consistent.
The size sorts in Table A1 produce at best a weak hint of a positive relation between dividend payout and size. The hint is stronger in the sorts on D t /ME t and D t /BE t , but these sorts are less effective in controlling for profitability and investment opportunities. The regressions (Table 1) , with more complete controls for other effects, provide reliable evidence that the marginal relation between the dividend payout and size is indeed positive.
A Blemish on the Pecking Order
In the one sharp face-off produced by the sorts and the regressions, the pecking order model beats the tradeoff model: more profitable firms have less book leverage. There is, however, a result in the nonpayers sorts that is more consistent with the tradeoff model. Specifically, the book and market leverage sorts in Table A2 show that less levered non-payers are more profitable, which is consistent with the pecking order model. But less levered non-payers also have better investments (higher V t /A t , RD t /A t , and dA t /A t ). And in the market leverage sorts, the spread of investment outlays (dA t /A t ) over earnings (E t /A t ) is higher for less levered non-payers. From the perspective of the simple pecking order model, the low leverage (book and market) of these firms is anomalous. Lower leverage for firms with higher spreads of investment over earnings (lower free cash flows) is, however, consistent with the tradeoff model.
One possibility is that the small growth firms that are the less levered non-payers conform to the complex rather than the simple version of the pecking order model; they keep leverage low to have lowrisk debt capacity available to finance future growth. But Table A2 shows that they seem to achieve this result by violating the pecking order. Specifically, the least levered non-payers make the largest net new issues of stock. In the market leverage sorts, the annual new issues of stock of the least levered nonpayers are on average six percent of total assets. And, at 29 percent of assets and 11 percent of market value, the book and market leverage of the least levered non-payers are low. Thus, the least levered nonpayers make large net new issues of stock (the form of financing most subject to asymmetric information problems), even though they have low risk debt capacity. This is not proper pecking order behavior.
Perhaps less levered non-payers issue lots of stock because their investments do not generate the kinds of fixed tangible assets efficiently financed with debt [Myers (1977) ]. But Table A2 shows that the ratio of depreciation to total assets, Dp t /A t , does not vary much across book or market leverage quintiles.
Thus less levered non-payers have average proportions of fixed tangible assets. Finally, perhaps the small growth firms that are the less levered non-payers do not face serious asymmetric information problems in issuing new equity. One might interpret the evidence that such firms have low stock returns [Fama and French (1993) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) ] as suggesting that they do suffer less from asymmetric information problems when they issue stock. But it is not in the spirit of the pecking order model that small firms whose prime asset is expected growth are less subject to asymmetric information problems. . The regressions require that firms pay dividends in year t-1. A t , BE t , ME t , L t =A t -BE t , and V t =L t +ME t are aggregate assets, book common equity, market value of common equity, book liabilities, and total market value, at the end of fiscal year t. Y t , RD t , and D t , are after tax earnings available for common stock, R&D expenditures, and dividends for fiscal year t. RDD t is a dummy that is 1.0 for firms that do not report R&D expenditures for t and zero otherwise. Investment, dA t , is A t -A t-1 . The regression R 2 are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The target payout TP is the average across years, of a/Mn(Y t+1 /A t )+a 1 +a 1V Mn(V t /A t )+a 1B Mn(D t /BE t )+a 1L Mn(L t /A t )+a 1A Mn(dA t /A t )+a 1M Mn(D t /ME t )+a 1D Mn(RDD t )+a 1R Mn(RD t /A t ) +a 1S Mn(ln(A t )), where Mn() is the cross-section mean of a variable for a year, and the a's are regression coefficents from (1). Here and in all following tables, we drop firms with assets less than $2.5 million or book equity less than $.5 million. (A t ) ), where the a 2 's are regression coefficents from (6). A t , BE t , ME t , L t =A t -BE t , and V t =L t +ME t are aggregate assets, book common equity, market value of common equity, book liabilities, and total market value, at the end of fiscal year t. Y t , RD t , and D t , are after tax earnings available for common stock, R&D expenditures, and dividends for fiscal year t. RDD t is a dummy that is 1.0 for firms that do not report R&D expenditures for t and zero otherwise. Investment, dA t , is A t -A t-1 . The regression R 2 are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The speed-of-adjustment, SOA, is the negative of the average slope on D t /A t . The target payout, TP, is the average slope on Y t+1 /A t divided by SOA. ]. The regressions in Parts A and C require that firms pay dividends in year t-1. The regressions in Parts B and D are for firms that do not pay dividends in year t-1. A t , BE t , ME t , L t = A t -BE t and V t = L t + ME t , and are assets, book common equity, market value of common equity, total liabilities, and total market value, at the end of fiscal year t. D t , ET t , DP t , and RD t are dividends, earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation expense, and R&D expenditures for fiscal year t. RDD t-1 is a dummy variable that is 1.0 for firms that report no R&D. The regression R 2 are adjusted for degrees of freedom. ]. The regressions in Parts A, C, and E require that firms pay dividends in year t-1. The regressions in Parts B, D, and F are for year t-1 non-payers. A t , BE t , ME t , L t = A t -BE t and V t = L t +ME t , and are assets, book common equity, market value of common equity, total liabilities, and total market value, at the end of fiscal year t. D t , ET t , E t , DP t , and RD t are dividends, earnings before interest and taxes, earnings before interest but after taxes, depreciation expense, and R&D expenditures for fiscal year t. RDD t-1 is a dummy variable that is 1.0 for firms that report no R&D. dE t = E t -E t-1 and dA t = A t -A t-1 . Target leverage E(L t+1 /V t+1 ) [ Taxes [Modigliani and Miller (1963) , Miller and Scholes (1978) , DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)] 1. Firms with higher expected marginal tax rates (more profitable firms and firms with less variable earnings) have more book leverage. 2. Controlling for profitability, firms with more non-debt tax shields (e.g., deductions for depreciation and R&D) have less book leverage. [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) , Jensen (1986) ] -Predictions are driven by the benefits of dividends and debt in controlling the agency problem created by free cash flow (the excess of current and expected earnings over current and expected profitable investments). 1. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with more profitable assets in place have higher dividend payouts and more book leverage. 2. Controlling for profitability, firms with larger profitable investments have lower dividend payouts and less book and market leverage. [Fama and Miller (1972) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers (1977) ] 1. Firms (especially dividend payers) with more expected investments have less current leverage. Whether the prediction applies to book or market leverage depends on whether low risk debt capacity is a function of the book or the market value of assets. Larger expected investments are associated with less book and market leverage when low risk debt capacity depends on the book value of assets. But this prediction is only firm for market leverage when low risk debt capacity depends on the market value of assets. [Myers (1984)] Predictions are driven by financing costs, including transactions costs and the asymmetric information problem that arises when investment must be financed with new issues of risky securities (risky debt and especially new stock). 1. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with more profitable assets in place have higher long-term dividend payouts and less book and market leverage. 2. Controlling for profitability, firms with more current and expected investment opportunities have lower long-term dividend payouts. 3. In the simple version of the model, given the profitability of assets in place, firms with more investments have more book leverage. 4. In a more complex version of the model, where firms balance current and expected future financing costs, dividend payers with more volatile net cash flows have lower dividend payouts and less leverage. And firms (especially dividend payers) with more expected investments have less current leverage. Whether the leverage predictions apply to book or market leverage depends on whether low risk debt capacity is a function of the book or the market value of assets. Larger expected investments are associated with less book and market leverage when low risk debt capacity depends on the book value of assets. But this prediction is only firm for market leverage when low risk debt capacity depends on the market value of assets. 5. Dividends are (for unknown reasons) sticky, leaving short-term variation in earnings and investment to be absorbed primarily by variation in debt.
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